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Hubbard (Cory) v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 54 (Aug. 2, 2018) (en banc)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: EVIDENCE, ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR BAD ACTS  
 
Summary 
 
 The Court held that intent is automatically at issue for specific-intent crimes. Therefore, 
criminal defendants need not place intent or absence of mistake at issue before the State seeks to 
admit prior act evidence if the evidence is relevant to prove an essential element of the offense 
(i.e., intent for the crime of burglary). However, prior act evidence may still be inadmissible 
where its minimal probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  
 
Background  
 
 On August 22, 2013, at about 8:45 p.m., the doorbell rang at a residence where several 
people were present. Upon answering the door, three men forcibly entered the residence 
brandishing firearms. The three men were alleged to be appellant Cory Dealvone Hubbard, 
Willie Carter, and Stelman Joseph. One of the assailants pointed a gun at the victims, taking their 
phones and other belongings. When one of the victims, Kenneth Flenory (“KJ”), ran for the front 
door, Hubbard allegedly tackled him. Another victim, David Powers, was upstairs during this 
altercation. David grabbed a gun and ran towards the staircase as Hubbard was coming up the 
stairs with a gun in his hand. David fired two or three times, hitting Hubbard in the left shoulder. 
One of the other two assailants shot at David, before all three assailants fled the residence.  
 
      Around 9:00 p.m. the same night, Hubbard entered a Short Line Express Market 
located about four miles from the residence. Hubbard had been shot in his left shoulder. In his 
statement to the police, Hubbard said he was shot randomly while walking down the street. The 
surveillance footage from the market did not show any vehicles dropping off an individual who 
matched Hubbard’s description. Except for KJ, none of the victims could positively identify 
Hubbard based on a photo lineup. KJ was 80-percent certain that Hubbard was one of the 
assailants. 
 
 Hubbard was charged with burglary “while in possession of one or more firearms, with 
intent to commit Larceny and/or any felony, and/or Robbery.” The State sought to admit 
evidence of Hubbard’s prior conviction for a residential burglary that occurred in the state of 
Washington in 2012. The State argued the evidence was admissible under NRS 48.045(2) to 
prove motive, intent, identity, and absence of mistake2 and to rebut a claim that Hubbard was an 
innocent victim of a random, unrelated shooting. The district court allowed the State to present 
this evidence to prove absence of mistake, motive, and intent after Hubbard claimed he was not 
involved in the robbery.  
 
 At trial, all but one of the victims in the residence testified. Carter, who pleaded guilty to 
robbery with a deadly weapon, also testified and denied that Hubbard was involved in the crime. 
                                                     
1  By Matthew J. McKissick. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.045(2) (2017). 
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Testimony from a crime scene analyst indicated that none of Hubbard’s DNA or fingerprints 
were found in the residence.  
 
 The victim of the 2012 burglary, Kimberly Davis, also testified. The district court gave 
the jury a limiting instruction that the evidence may only be considered to prove Hubbard’s 
intent and/or motive to commit the crimes or the absence of mistake. Davis testified that, in 
2012, she was home alone when she observed a man on her front porch and a white car on the 
street. The man repeatedly rang the doorbell, but she did not answer, and the man left. She saw 
the car return, heard the doorbell ring again, and then heard footsteps outside her window. Davis 
locked herself in the bathroom, she heard people enter the house, and someone attempted to 
force open the bathroom door without success. The intruders left, and Davis discovered several 
articles of jewelry and other items missing from the home. Davis never actually saw any of the 
intruders.       
 
 Hubbard was the only witness to testify in his defense and explained that he was shot 
during an unrelated drug deal that had been arranged by Joseph. Hubbard testified that he drove 
to a parking lot near the Short Express Market where a person with drugs entered his vehicle. 
While Hubbard was inspecting the drugs, another person came around his vehicle and shot him 
in the left shoulder. Hubbard testified that he had never been in the residence where the robbery 
occurred, he did not know any of the victims, and denied all involvement in the robbery. 
Hubbard admitted to being convicted of the 2012 burglary and that he had sustained three other 
felony convictions.  
 
 The State referenced the 2012 burglary in its closing argument, stating that the evidence 
could be used to prove Hubbard’s intent to commit burglary and to prove he was not shot 
mistakenly or accidentally. Hubbard was convicted, adjudicated a habitual criminal, and 
sentenced to serve ten concurrent life sentences without the possibility of parole. Hubbard 
appealed, and the Court transferred the case to the court of appeals.  
 
 The court of appeals concluded that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in 
admitting the testimony of the 2012 burglary because it was not relevant for any of the State’s 
proffered nonpropensity uses. The court of appeals held that Hubbard did not place his intent at 
issue by arguing that he was not present at the robbery, that the evidence against Hubbard was 
not overwhelming, and that the error in admitting the evidence was not harmless. Accordingly, 
the court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case. The Court 
granted review on the limited issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting 
the prior bad act evidence since the defense did not put intent or absence of mistake at issue.      
 
Discussion 
 
I.  Admission of the 2012 burglary conviction 
  
All prior bad act evidence is presumably inadmissible.3 To overcome this presumption, 
the State must show that: (1) the prior bad act is relevant and is offered “for a purpose other than 
                                                     
3  Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252, 259, 129 P.3d 671, 677 (2006) (quoting Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 195, 111 
P.3d 690, 697 (2005)). 
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proving the defendant’s propensity, (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence, and 
(3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.”4 The district court’s decision to admit evidence will not be overturned absent a 
manifest abuse of discretion.5 The Court’s first step in any NRS 48.045(2) analysis is identifying 
the “at-issue, nonpropensity purpose” for admitting the evidence.6 The State offered the evidence 
to prove intent and absence of mistake, and the Court addressed each in turn.  
  
     A.  Intent 
  
Hubbard argued that intent is an element of every crime, so unless intent is raised “in 
substance” or is “at issue,” bad act evidence is inadmissible to prove it. Because intent was not at 
issue, evidence of the 2012 burglary was irrelevant. The State, on the other hand, argued that 
intent is automatically at issue in specific intent crimes, and therefore it is not necessary for 
defendants to contest intent before the prosecution addresses it.  
 
 The Court adopted United States v. Gomez, holding that intent is automatically at issue 
for specific intent crimes, and evidence of other acts may be admissible to prove intent.7 
However, the rule is not one of automatic admission. The other-act evidence “must be relevant 
without relying on a propensity inference, and its probative value must not be substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.”8 Also, the degree to which the issue is actually 
contested may affect the probative value of the other-act evidence.9  
 
 Here, the State charged Hubbard with burglary—a specific intent crime—and therefore 
had the burden of proving Hubbard’s specific intent upon entering the residence. The Court held 
that the 2012 burglary had minimal relevance to the issue of intent because the facts left little 
doubt that at the time the perpetrators entered the residence, they intended to commit a robbery.  
“When a person’s conduct leaves no real doubts as to the actor’s intent, it is difficult to see much 
need or justification for similar acts on that issue.”10 Hubbard did not argue that he entered the 
residence for an innocent reason and then formed the intent to commit robbery. Rather, Hubbard 
denied participating in the act at all. Under these facts, the evidence of the 2012 burglary had 
little relevance to proving intent, and the minimal probative value was substantially outweighed 
by the risk of unfair prejudice.  
 
     B.  Absence of mistake 
  
Hubbard argued that mistake can only be at issue when the defendant raises it as a 
defense, which he did not do. The State countered that NRS 48.045 permits prior act evidence to 
prove absence of mistake regardless of whether raised by the defendant, and the absence of 
                                                     
4  Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev. 108, 117, 270 P.3d 1244, 1250 (2012). 
5  Rhymes v. State, 121 Nev. 17, 21–22, 107 P.3d 1278, 1281 (2005). 
6  Newman v. State, 129 Nev. 222, 231, 298 P.3d 1171, 1178 (2013) (citing United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 
698 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
7  United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 858 (7th Cir. 2014). 
8  Id. at 859. 
9  Id. 
10  Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, 3 Jones on Evidence § 17:64 (7th ed. 2016). 
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mistake was relevant because Hubbard claimed he was not present and was shot during an 
unrelated incident.  
  
Under NRS 48.045(2), the absence of mistake exception applies when “the evidence 
tends to show the defendant’s knowledge of a fact material to the specific crime charged.”11 
Thus, the absence of mistake exception may be relevant to prove either the mens rea or the actus 
rea. The exception is grounded in the law of probabilities.  
  
Here, evidence of the 2012 burglary would have been relevant to prove that Hubbard 
entered the residence with felonious intent rather than by mistake, or as an innocent victim of the 
circumstances surrounding the robbery. However, the State did not make those arguments for 
admitting the evidence, and instead asserted that the evidence was relevant to prove that Hubbard 
was the perpetrator who was shot during the robbery and did not receive the wound during some 
unrelated accident. In essence, the State tried to use the evidence to prove identity—not absence 
of mistake. Thus, as with intent, the prior bad act had little relevance on the issue of absence of 
mistake. 
  
Due to the lack of relevance that the 2012 burglary had to either intent or absence of 
mistake, the Court concluded that the evidence was used for impermissible propensity purposes. 
The evidence’s low probative value was substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice, and the 
district court’s decision to admit it was a manifest abuse of discretion.  
 
II.  Harmless error 
  
Any error in admitting evidence under NRS 48.045(2) is subject to harmless error 
review.12 The State argued any error was harmless because (1) the State could have used the 
prior convictions to impeach Hubbard on cross-examination and (2) the evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming. The Court rejected both arguments.  
  
First, the Court explained that prior felony convictions are admissible for impeachment 
purposes only. Impeachment evidence cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt or to show 
propensity. Davis’ testimony regarding the 2012 burglary was admitted for a substantive 
purpose—to prove intent and absence of mistake. Moreover, the quality of the impeachment 
evidence (the prior convictions) was less prejudicial than Davis’ live testimony. Most 
importantly, had the district court excluded Davis’ testimony, Hubbard might have chosen not to 
testify. Thus, the Court concluded that the use of the impeachment evidence did not rendered 
harmless the erroneous admission of Davis’ testimony.  
  
Second, the Court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming: none of 
the victims could identify Hubbard in a photo lineup, except KJ who was only 80 percent certain; 
Carter, who pleaded guilty, testified that he did not know Hubbard; none of Hubbard’s DNA or 
fingerprints were found in the residence; and none of the surveillance footage at the market 
showed a vehicle dropping Hubbard off. Hubbard explained that he called Joseph because they 
were friends, that Joseph had arranged a drug deal but never showed up, and that he was not 
                                                     
11  Cirillo v. State, 96 Nev. 489, 492, 611 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1980). 
12  Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 198, 111 P.3d 690, 699 (2005). 
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forthcoming with the police about his injury because of his previous negative experiences with 
the police. Based on these facts, the Court could not say with confidence that admitting evidence 
of the prior burglary conviction was harmless. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Applying Gomez, intent is automatically at issue for specific intent crimes. Therefore, 
criminal defendants need not contest intent before the prosecution seeks to address it using prior 
act evidence. However, the evidence may still be inadmissible if its minimal probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The district court manifestly abused its 
discretion in admitting the evidence of the defendant’s 2012 burglary conviction, and the trial 
court’s error was not harmless. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of conviction and 
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.      
 
Dissent 
 
J. Hardesty, with whom J. Pickering, agrees, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
 The dissent agreed with the majority’s adoption of Gomez—that intent is automatically at 
issue for specific intent crimes. However, the dissent did not agree that the district court abused 
its discretion by admitting evidence of the 2012 burglary on the issue of intent. To the dissent, 
the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence of prior bad acts should be given great 
deference.  
  
Further, even if the district court erred in admitting the bad acts evidence, the error was 
harmless. An error is harmless when it does not have “a substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict,”13 and in the dissent’s view, the circumstantial 
evidence of Hubbard’s guilt was overwhelming.   
  
The record showed that Hubbard arrived at the Joseph’s gated community at 7:53 p.m., 
called Joseph’s phone at 7:54 p.m. while at the gate, and again at 7:58 p.m. At 8:43 p.m., the 
victim’s neighbor’s surveillance video showed an SUV, later identified as belonging to Joseph, 
pulling up to the victim’s house. The victims testified that they were robbed at gunpoint.  KJ 
identified Hubbard with 80-percent certainty, and other family members identified one of the 
men as having attributes that matched Hubbard’s description. That man (allegedly Hubbard) ran 
up the stairs, but was shot by David in the left shoulder. The three men then fled the residence, 
and David was able to identify Joseph as one of the perpetrators. At the end of the neighbor’s 
surveillance footage, Hubbard and Joseph are shown running back into the SUV and driving 
away, while Carter shot into the house and ran away on foot.  
  
David called 911 at 8:51 p.m. to report the robbery. Five minutes later, at 8:56 p.m., 
Joseph called 911to report that his friend had been shot, and this call was made near the location 
of the Short Line Express Market. Shortly after, Hubbard entered the Short Line Express Market, 
and at 8:58 p.m., the cashier called 911 to report Hubbard’s gunshot wound. After being arrested, 
Hubbard called Joseph seven times at the same number Joseph used to make the 911 call.  
                                                     
13  Newman v. State, 129 Nev. 222, 236, 298 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2013). 
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The dissent concluded that the circumstantial evidence connecting Hubbard to the 
robbery was overwhelming. Thus, the same result would have been reached had the trial court 
not admitted the prior bad act evidence, and the dissent would have affirmed the judgement of 
conviction.  
 
 
